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THE FOUR CONSTITUTIONS OF KENTUCKY*
The first Constitution of Kentucky was the work of a Convention which began its labors in the early part of April, 1792,
and completed them before the month had ended. In the agitation looking to a statehood separate from that of Virginia which
went on for many years preceding the admission of Kentucky
into the Union, nine conventions had been held to effect that
end, but to no purpose. During this period there was a wide debate and discussion on the fundamental principles of organic
law, especially in such clubs as the Danville Political Club, and
the people were singularly well informed about these matters.
Due to the manner of its settlement, its economic environment,
its more or less isolation from the Atlantic seaboard and the character of its immigration, the thought of the people was dominated by the theories of liberty, equality and democracy. In
such a state of mind, it was as easy for the demagogue in these
remote settlements as it was for him in France at this same
period to raise the cry of aristocracy, and though the community was yet young, agitators had attempted to stir up a class
hatred which made up in clamor what it lacked in vigor. It was
against this background that the Convention did its work. This
Convention was composed of the best thought of the electorate
and its work is a singular combination of pure democracy and of
checks upon it. As in all of our Constitutions and according
to the prevailing political thought of that time which has persisted to the present day, although now subject to the assault of
politico-philosophical thinkers, the powers of government were
divided into three distinct departments-the legislative, the executive and the judicial. With regard to the legislative, the preconvention debate has a very modern ring to it. The argument
as to whether there should be one or two houses of the legislature had been quite acrimonious. The champions of the one
house were very vigorous in the presentation of their views.
Does the provision in the City Government Bill recently adopted
*The writer acknowledges his indebtedness in the preparation of
this article to the address of Mr. John C. Doolan on "The Constitution
and Constitutional Conventions of 1792 and 1799," appearing in the 1917
proceedings of the Kentucky State Bar Association; to the History of
Kentucky, by W. E. Connelley and E. M. Coulter, of which Judge Chas.
Kerr was editor; and "to Judge John D. Carroll's Kentucky Statutes.

Tan Foum CoNsTITUTIOs or KENTuCKy
by the legislature for the City of Louisville, wherein the unicameral system is adopted, presage a trend toward the views of
these earlier thinkers? The Convention of 1792, however, rejected their contentions and adopted the bi-cameral system which
prevails to this day. In providing for elections to the legislature, however, the Convention showed both its predelietion for
democracy and its fears of it unrestrained. The house was to be
elected by the people and its membership was apportioned among
the counties according to population rather than according to the
Virginia method of apportioning the number among the counties
regardless of the population. The number of the representatives was to be not less than 40 nor more than 100, and provision
was made for taking the census of the population to regulate the
apportionment. *While the house was thus responsive directly to
the people, the Convention adopted a curious plan following
somewhat that of the electoral college of the Federal Constitution
for the election of senators and governors. The people were authorized to vote for as many members of an electoral college as
they were entitled to vote for representatives. The electoral college thus selected, elected the governor and the senators
and the Constitution enjoined upon it to elect "men of the most
wisdom, experience and virtue." The number of representatives
being forty, that of the senators was fixed at eleven, with the provision that there should be one new senator for every increase
of four in the house of representatives and until each county
had at least one senator. The term of office of the members of
the House was one year, that of the senators four years, onefourth of that body being elected each year. The Constitution
provided that no minister should be eligible for membership in
either body and this provision remained in our Constitutions
until the present one. The legislature was to meet in annual
session and there was no limit set upon the length of such sessions. In the pre-convention agitation the militia companies of
Bourbon county had adopted a resolution urging the legislature
that "no code or laws of England or other nations be adopted,
but a simple, concise code of laws be framed adapted to the
weakest capacity which we humbly conceive will happily supersede the necessity of attorneys pleading in our state."
The Governor was to be elected for a term of four years,
but there was no provision for a lieutenant governor, the Consti-
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tution providing that the speaker of the senate who was elected
by that body should in case of a vacancy of the office of Governor exercise the duties of that office "until another shall be duly
qualified." This peculiar phrase "until another shall be duly
qualified," was carried over to our second Constitution, and, as
we shall see, caused grave trouble when Governor Slaughter
succeeded to the governorship on the death of Governor Madison.
The Governor had the power of appointing an Attorney General
and Secretary of State.
The judicial power of the government was vested in the
Court of Appeals and such inferior courts as the legislature
might from time to time establish. No qualifications for the office
of a judge appeared in either the first or second Constitutions.
It was not until the judiciary became elective that it was felt
necessary to prescribe qualifications that the people might not be
misled. Original jurisdiction was given to the Court of Appeals
in land suits, a matter which soon caused trouble, as we shall see.
In the matter of elections, the Constitution showed the advanced
position in democracy which Kentucky had then reached.
The Constitution provided for universal male suffrage, no
property qualification, and for a secret ballot. It also provided
that there should be no religious test for office holding. It further provided that elections might extend over a period of as
much as three days. This in time caused great scandal, as it
offered opportunity for much bribery and corruption.
Article IX was the famous article on slavery. There had
been a vigorous fight led by the ministers, who were a par of
this Convention, for an article prohibiting slavery. The slave
owners, however, won, but the article on slavery was an advanced
provision for that day and time. Emancipation, although
guarded, was possible, and the legislature was vested with the
right to prohibit the domestic as well as the foreign slave trade.
This article also enjoined the exercise of humanity towards these
unfortunates.
The Constitution had a provision for universal military
service so needed in those times of Indian warfare. There was
had a bill of rights in which those fundamental rights vested in
freemen so familiar to us all and which have come down to us
from Magna Charta were set forth.
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Section 27 of article I provided that each senator, representative and sheriff should, before taking office, take an oath that
he had not directly or indirectly given or promised any bribery
or treat to procure his election to the said office. This section
dso provided that every person should be disqualified from
holding any such office for the term for which he might have been
elected who should be convicted "of having given or offered any
bribe or treat, or canvassed for the said office." This is the
earliest corrupt practice act that has come to our notice and we
call particular attention to the stringent provision prohibiting a
canvass for office.
It was not long after this Constitution was put into effect
that troubles under it arose and the troubles affected each department of the government. The first clash came with reference
to the Court of Appeals. In the case of McConnelZ v. Kenton,1
the court had before it a land case of the character of which it
had original jurisdiction. It was decided in 1792; Judges Muter
and Sebastian voting for the prevailing opinion and Judge Wallace dissenting. It was thought that this decision ran counter
to the principles on whic land titles then rested and a storm of
disapproval arose in the state. A rehearing was ordered in 1795
at which Judge Muter changed his mind and voted with Judge
Wallace. Another rehearing was then called for. The legislature did its best to get these judges removed from office and thus
opened the prologue to the drama of the struggle between the
legislature and the judiciary which was to have its cuhnination
in the old and new court controversy of 1826, when this state
behold two Courts of Appeals, each claiming to be the only valid
one exercising judicial functions. But as Kipling says: "That
is another story." The legislature was unable to secure the necessary constitutional majority to remove these judges from office,
but they did, as they had a right to do, take away from the Court
of Appeals its original jurisdiction in land suits.
The second clash under the Constitution came with reference
to the legislature. The salaries of the judges of the Court of
Appeals had been fixed at six hundred sixty-six dollars and twothirds cents a year, and that of the other judges at one hundred
dollars a year. With commendable self-denial the legislature had
flxed their own salaries at one dollar a day. Then, as in the
1 Hughes 257, 322.
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recent attempt to amend section 246 of the present Constitution,
it was argued that the salaries were not attracting or, if attracting, not holding the best men for the offices involved. Particularly was this so with reference to the judges of the courts inferior to the Court of Appeals, where the salary was only one
hundred dollars a year. In 1796 the legislature took courage and
raised these various salaries, including that of its own, which it
changed from one dollar to one dollar and fifty cents a day. The
members were denounced on every stump in the state for thus
adding to the burdens of taxation, and it was gravely debated
whether or not under the then Constitution they were eligible
for re-election to a body, the salaries of the members of which
they had raised.
The next clash came with reference to the executive branch
of the goyernment. In 1796 in the gubernatorial election of that
year Benjamin Logan received 21 votes in the electoral college;
James Garrard 17 votes; Thomas Todd 14 and John Brown 1.
The Constitution was silent as to whether the successful candidate must receive a plurality of the votes or a majority. The
electoral college denied that the successful candidate should receive a majority and thereupon they dropped the two lowest
men and proceeded to take another vote on Logan and Garrard.
On the second ballot Garrard was declared eleeted. Logan did
not submit tamely, and for a while things looked squally. Garrard prevailed, however, and was in time duly inaugurated as
our second Governor. But the great mass of the people which
had never looked with friendly eyes on this electoral device felt
that Logan had been cheated out of the office to which he had
been legally elected, and the old cry of aristocracy again went
up.
The Constitution of 1792 made it very difficult to call a new
constitutional convention. In the agitation against those called
aristocrats, the conservative elements of the state took fright.
They were especially in fear of an effort to emancipate the slaves
and a warfare of handbills pro and con on the question of calling
a new constitutional convention arose.
But the people were not to be denied and after the necessary
majority in the necessary elections had been obtained our second
constitutional convention met on July 22, 1799, and twentyseven days later adopted our second Constitution. The text of
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this second Constitution in the main followed that of the first.
The minimum number of representatives was raised to fifty-eight,
the maximum remaining the same. They were to be elected annually and hold office for one year. The electoral college was
abolished and the senators and. the Governor were elected directly by the people. The senators were elected for four years,
the term of one-fourth of the membership of that body expiring
each year. The minimum number of senators was fixed at twenty-four with one new senator for every three additional representatives.
The Governor was made ineligible to succeed himself for
seven years, and a provision was inserted for a lieutenant governor. The provision with reference to courts was pretty much
the same as that in the first Constitution except that the Court
of Appeals had no original jurisdiction. The Constitution provided that the compensation of the judges should be "adequate
compensation fixed by law." But the additional requirement of
the first Constitution to the effect that such compensation should
not be diminished during their term of office was omitted and
when the great controversy over the old and new court came up
an effort was made to get the old judges out of office by diminishing their compensation to the zero point which was not successful. Had it been, the question would have arisen whether or not
such compensation was an adequate compensation. A host of
minor offices such as sheriffs, county attorneys, jailers, coroners
and others were made appointive. There also appeared a provision authorizing the settling of cases for arbitration out of
court. Our forefathers were very suspicious and jealous of
lawyers and were anxious in every way possible to get rid of them
and to dispense with their services. It may be said, however,
that section 250 of our present Constitution is quite similar to
this section 10 of article VI of the second Constitution. Universal
male suffrage was retained in the second Constitution, but voting
was changed from the secret ballot to viva voce, which remained
the method until our present Constitution was adopted. Article
VII on slaves was almost identical to article IX of the old Constitution. In this second Constitution appears the first educational requirement for office ever exacted by an American state,
Section 10 of article IV provided that the clerks of the courts
must take an examination before the judges of the Court of Ap.
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peals to demonstrate their qualifications for the office they
sought.
This second Constitution by its provisions for amendments
and calling a new constitutional convention made it almost impossible to bring about that result, and it was not until over fifty
years later that a third Constitution was adopted, although the
people very early began to demand amendments and a new Constitution.
In 1816 Governor Madison died and Lieutenant Governor
Slaughter succeeded to the governorship. It was about the time
of the beginning of the end of the Federalist party and Governor
Slaughter's attitude, especially in connection with the resignation of his secretary of state Todd, gave the impression that he
was inclined toward the Federalists. A great debate arose as to
the meaning of the words "until another be duly qualified" to
which reference has heretofore been made. Those opposed to
Slaughter argued that they implied that another' electiQn should
be called to fill the vacancy. Slaughter's friends argued that they
meant a regular election in due course. Slaughter filled out the
term until the election of 1820, but the seeds of the controversy
were still there and the matter was never settled until the Constitution of 1850. In 1837 the legislature passed a bill looking towards the calling of a constitutional convention. The Whigs opposed the bill as they thought it was an effort on the part of
their opponents, the Democrats, to grab and retain power. The
emancipators took up the fight for a convention, which cooled the
ardor of the Democrats, and the vote taken under the bill failed
to authorize the calling of the convention. The great cause of dissatisfaction with the second Constitution was the host of appointive offices. Nepotism prevailed to a great extent. It was claimed
that there was an oligarchy of office holders among which the
offices circulated. It was even charged that the selling of offices
was prevalent. The people thought that they ought to have the
right to elect their sheriffs, their jailers, their coroners and
county attorneys. The new and old court controversy was still
fresh in the minds of the voters, and it was thought that a judiciary responsive to the people would be less tyrannical than one
appointed by the Governor. The educational system was in a sad
state, although many beautiful plans had been laid out on paper,
The mass of the people were still in ignorance. The funds set
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apart for educational purposes had not always been devoted to
those ends, but in times of need had been diverted to the other
needs of the state. The three days of elections had given rise to
corruption and fraud. The sessions of the legislature had been
extended to unusual lengths and its time was taken up with
passing special laws. A quaint complaint is made with regard
to one of the later sessions of the legislature about devoting its
time to passing special laws for divorce and changing the names
of the people. It was said that at one session there were fortyfour acts granting divorces, one of these acts being an omnibus
act divorcing twenty-six peop]e at one time. There was also a
number of acts changing the names of the people. The complainants said: "If this state of things is allowed to progress, people
will hardly know in a few years their nearest acquaintance by
name or who is or is not married." We wonder what this same
author would say today on picking up a newspaper and counting
the number of divorces granted weekly by our chancery courts.
Cassius Marcellus Clay in his Memoirs, claims that the agitation carried on by him and others against slavery at this time
was the impelling cause for the calling of the third constitutional
convention. He says in this book that he had pointed out the
posssibility and feasibility of emancipation under the second
Constitution and in fear of this, the slave holders were anxious
to get another Constitution wherein this possibility would be
made so remote as to be practically nonexistent. It must be admitted that article X of the third Constitution, which replaced
article VII of the second Constitution, these being the slavery
articles, went far towards accomplishing that purpose. The
constitutional convention of 1850 was finally called and the third
Constitution adopted. The new legislature was to be elected biannually, the representatives and one-half of the senate every
two years. The representatives held office for two years and the
senators four years. The number of representatives was fixed
at one hundred and that of the senate at thirty-eight. These
numbers prevail to this day. The legislature was prohibited to
a large extent from passing special laws, especially with regard
to divorce and changing of names. The sinking fund was protected and provisions were inserted for the education of the
masses and the protection of the school fund. Clay says this
was done to placate the non-slave holding whites. Reminiscent
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of the hard times which caused the old and new court controversy
a provision for homestead exemption was inserted in the Constitution. In the great rush for internal improvements that took
place in the 30's the state had become much indebted and so there
appeared in this third Constitution in section 35 of article II a
restriction on the right of the legislature to contract debts in
excess of $500,000, which provision was carried over into section
49 of our fourth Constitution. Due to judicial construction its
salutary tendency has almost been destroyed, and we now have a
floating debt of almost $5,000,000, when had this section been
strictly construed the legislature would never have been able to
contract such a debt without at the same time providing the
means of paying it. The Governor was to be elected for four
years and the gubernational succession was cleared up by a provision that if a vacancy occurred before two years of the term
had expired a new electionmust be held. The sessions of the
legislature were limited to sixty days unless two-thirds majority
of both houses extended the same. As this majority was always
obtainable this limitation never amounted to much. Also for
the first time there appeared the, provision that a] bill should relate to but one subject and that should be expressed in the title.
Although there has been much debate as to the wisdom of such a
provision, it was carried over into our fourth Constitution and
experience has demonstratdd its worth.
This third Constitution provided for an elective judiciary.
Clay says this was also done to reconcile the poor whites to slavery. It provided for a, Court of Appeals, the courts established
by that Constitution, among which were the circuit court and
the county court, and such other courts as the legislature might
from time to time establish. The host of minor offices theretofore appointive were made elective.
There appeared in this Constitution of 1850 as a sort of
challenge to the radicals of that day, that famous clause carTied
over into the fourth Constitution reading: "The absolute arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and property of freemen exists
nowhere in a Republic, not even in the largest majority." A
great philosophical truth, but whether or not it should ever be
called in question by such a majority it will prevail is a highly
debatable point. The Constitution provided also for revision of
the laws and for a committee to draft codes of civil and criminal
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practice, which latter injunction being carried out has given us
those splendid codes which with their amendments govern us
to this day. The provisions for amendment made that purpose
almost impossible of accomplishment.
Ten years after the adoption of this Constitution came the
great struggle for the preservation of the Union, and with its
passage and the reconstruction days which followed, coupled
with the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the Federal Constitution, a great deal of our third Constitution, especially with
reference to slavery, because obsolete. But the inertia against
calling a fourth convention was hard to overcome and it was not
until 1890 that this end was accomplished.
The fourth Constitution is about twice the length of the
third, and its main characteristic is the embodiment therein of
much that should have been left to legislative action. The greatest criticism of this instrument is that the framers of it went
far beyond the province of a Constitution and embodied therein
too much of a legislative program. For instance, section 243
provides for a child labor law; section 244 that wage earners are
to be paid in lawful money; section 247 that public printing is
to be let to the lowest responsible bidder; section 252 that hcuses
of reform are to be established; section 253 that convicts must
not be worked outside the prison walls except in certain instances, and many other provisions of like import, of undoubted
merit, but legislative in character, rather than constitutional.
In the new Constitution the secret ballot was restored, the sessions of the legislature were limited to sixty days, its power to
pass special laws was curtailed in twenty-nine instances; all
reference to slavery was omitted, and there was much new matter added with reference to municipalities, revenue, taxation,
education, corporations, railroads and commerce. Especially
stringent were the constitutional provisions against corporations
which is reminiscent of the political and economic thought of
that time. Although the Constitution of 1850 had put restrictions on the state getting itself in debt, the counties and cities
had not likewise been so restricted and in the era of railroad
construction following the war cities and towns had much encumbered themselves with debts to pay for such construction.
In many instances this construction had not followed the grants
of aid and bitter controversy arose such as the Taylor, Muhlen-
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berg and Green county bond cases. The new Constitution wisely
placed limitations on the power of these subordinate governmental agencies to create debts. The provisions with reference
to taxation reflected the economic thought of that time and it
was found later necessary to amend these sections to conform to
the great principles underlying the economic laws of taxation.
The power of the legislature to establish courts other than those
established by the Constitution was taken away and only those
courts created by that instrument were allowed. The clerk of
the court was made ineligible to succeed himself, a very curious
and cumbersome provision and one totally indefensible. Such
may also be said of a like provision relating to the office of superintendent of public instruction, attorney general, and to other
offices where the experience of a term if worthily filled should
dictate the reasonableness of returning such incumbent to office.
Although neither the law nor the acts calling the constitutional convention provided for a submission to the voters of the
labors of that body, it was done. The necesqary majority for the
instrument having been acquired, the convention reassembled
and made some changes in the instrument as thus approved by
the people. Some argued that these changes were materialothers that they were simply changes of verbiage. In the case
of Miller v. Johnson2 the question came before the Court of Appeals as to whether or not the convention had a right to thus reassemble and make these changes. The court in an opinion by
Chief Justice Holt, to which a vigorous dissenting opinion by
Judge Bennett was filed, declined to go into the matter and held
that whether or not the new Constitution in its final form was
the organic law of the state was a political question and not a
judicial one, and as it had been recognized by the political powers
as the legally adopted Constitution, the judicial power would
accept it as such. And this is the Constitution with its amendments which we enjoy today.
As stated, many of its provisions no longer are in accord
with the political and economic thought of this day. Its many
provisions of a legislative character have at times proved embarrassing to forward movements in the state. Many of its restrictions not of a constitutional nature have proved embarrassing to
2 92 Ky. 589.
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the various departments of government-such as the inability
of the legislature under section 249 to employ such help as it
needs to discharge its functions. The time will undoubtedly
come when the people in their sovereign capacity will reassemble for the purpose of adopting a new instrument. May we be
guided in the light of our experience under the fourth Constitution to adopt a new one that will be responsive from time to
time to the needs of the people and guarantee them in the enjoyment of those great ends to which all constitutional government
should be dedicated-the right of life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness.
Louisville, Kentucky.
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Justice of the Court of Appeals.

